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Abstract 
 
The aim of this study is to contribute to the current literature concerning the social acceptance of 
illegal practices. Using legal pluralism as a general framework of analysis, this study discusses the 
relationship between state law and alternative perspectives concerning its legitimacy.  It presents 
the experience of people involved in hashish harvesting in one of the regions of Kyrgyzstan, how 
the state defines it as an “illegal practice”, and how the local population subsequently invokes 
normative systems based on local spiritual knowledge and the local moral economy of hashish 
production. It argues that acceptance of hashish harvesting as a legitimate means of support is 
not a straightforward process. Despite the predominant legitimating narrative of hashish 
harvesting, it enters into a conversation with state defined notions of “illegality” and is also 
shaped by the customary understanding of the spiritual power of cannabis plants that requires 
caution when making hashish.  
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Introduction		
 
During the summers of 2008 and 2009, I stayed with a family in Toolu village1 in the Tyup 
region of Kyrgyzstan. This region was known for its wild-growing cannabis plants with a higher 
concentration of tetracannabinol2 than elsewhere in the country. Hashish and marijuana3 made in 
Tyup had a wide-reaching reputation even during Soviet times, especially among members of the 
criminal underworld who came to the region during summertime to process the plants. 
However, hashish-making only became widespread among the local population following the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union when former kolkhoz and sovkhoz4 workers turned to illegal 
hashish and marijuana production alongside other economic activities. During the 2000s, 
hashish-making became an informal source of economic and social security among Kyrgyzstan’s 
cannabis harvesters. Toolu inhabitants understood that hashish-making was an illegal enterprise 
but came to accept it as a means of income in the context of rapid impoverishment, weakened 
state welfare services, and a limited job market.  
My research is based on a mixed method study undertaken in the Tyup and Ak-Suu 
raions5 located in the Karkyra valley of Issyk-Kul oblast6 in Kyrgyzstan. I collected sixty-four 
informal interviews and conducted a survey from 147 structured interviews. Fieldwork took 
place over nine months during which I visited the main research site, Toolu, on two separate 
occasions. The trips took place from July until December 2009 and from July until September 
2010. While ethnographic research allowed me to learn about local residents’ attitudes towards 
the illegal drug economy, which would have been impossible through a more formalised and 
structured approach, the survey allowed me to obtain general information on the socio-economic 
conditions of Toolu households.   
Using the example of illegal hashish harvesting in Toolu, this paper explores the everyday 
responses to illegality and perceived im/morality. Many studies of the post-Soviet region argue 
                                               
1 The name of the village has been changed for ethical reasons.  
2 Tetracannabinol is the main psychoactive ingredient of cannabis plants.  
3 Hashish is a cannabis resin and marijuana constitute of cannabis leaves. 
4Kolkhoz was a collective farm and sovkhoz was a state collective farm. In rural agricultural areas such collective farms 
employed most of the population during Soviet times.  
5A raion is a smaller administrative region within an oblast. 
6 An oblast is a type of administrarive region, similar to a county in the UK.  
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that state authorities were themselves involved in illegal activities as a result of the infiltration by 
criminal groups or the predatory tendencies of the state itself (Beck and Chistyakova, 2002; 
Gans-Morse, 2012; Kupatadze, 2014; Stephenson, 2015). They remind us of the ambivalent 
nature of the state, where illegality does not necessarily threaten it and in some cases the state 
uses illegal practices to strengthen its position (Reeves, 2014). 
More recently, the local community standpoint has emerged as a defining feature in 
studies of illegality. Alternative viewpoints towards what was defined as il/legal allow us to 
understand the multifaceted morality of illegal transactions (Humphrey, 2002), acceptance of 
informal practices (Ledeneva, 2006), and the discrepancies between local, cultural and state 
understandings of bribery (Polese, 2008; Werner, 2000). This literature demonstrates that some 
activities defined as illegal by the state could be defined as appropriate and ethical according to 
the “living law” guiding quotidian perceptions and moral codes (Urinboyev and Svensson, 2013).  
Many studies outside the post-Soviet region demonstrate how illegal practices, despite 
pressure from states and social institutions, become legitimated locally (Galemba, 2012; 
Galemba, 2013; Webb et al, 2009; Westermeyer, 2004). For De Sardan (1999), some cases 
highlight the local context and specific conditions that enable a practice which is grounded in 
native cultural norms and legal regulations and contrasts with Western criminal justice and 
definitions of corruption. Galemba’s (2013) work illuminates how the contraband sale of corn 
from Mexico to Guatemala was legitimated by the everyday working practices of poor people 
who were trapped by neoliberal market conditions. Engwicht (2017) also found that illegal 
mining and the sale of diamonds in Sierra Leone were considered as moral by local miners. In 
Dewey’s (2012) research, illegal practices of car thefts and their trading in Buenos Aires was 
legitimated, or at least tolerated, due to the protection provided by the police.  
While providing good explanation for the existence of legitimating narratives for 
violation of legal rules, these studies have mostly focused on informal economic activities 
exchanging or producing otherwise legal goods. While according to Beckert and Wehinger (2012) 
illegal economic activities also include violation of legal regulations while exchanging or 
producing illegal goods. Legitimation of activities involving illegal goods much more difficult 
compared to ‘informal’ ones, and varies depending on people’s perception of such goods (Ibid, 
2012). Thus, more studies focusing on legitimating narratives of ‘illegal’ activities that do not 
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only violate the legal rules but also involve illegal goods are needed. This paper, aims to 
contribute to this literature, as hashish itself and its production and sale are illegal in Kyrgyzstan.  
In this paper, I argue that the persistence of illegal hashish harvesting in Toolu should be 
understood in relation to a wider legitimating narrative, which refers to work ethics and moral 
judgements about the corrupt behaviour of state officials. This wider narrative is further 
complicated by local understandings of the spiritual power of cannabis plants. I will begin by 
reviewing the literature concerning the co-existence of local and state responses to hashish-
making. This will be followed by a description of the hashish-making process and the main 
actors in Toolu. I then turn my attention to the process of legitimation used by the local 
population, by first discussing the right to subsistence and work, and how cases of corruption 
among law enforcement officers lead to changes in the perception of the law and the role of the 
state. With these dynamics in play, some residents still denied that hashish-making was part of 
their strategy to overcome the psychological tensions between the legal rules and the harsh reality 
of rural life in a neoliberal state. The last section presents how money earned through hashish is 
also seen as “bitter money”.  
 
Plurality	of	il/legality	and	im/morality	
 
To explain how an activity that is illegal in the eyes of the state, and had been popularly 
considered to bring bad luck, became an acceptable practice at a certain juncture, I will draw on 
concepts from otherwise disconnected fields of study.  
First, I focus on the notion of “moral economy” initially coined by E.P. Thompson 
(1971) when writing about the bread riots in 16th and 17th centuries in England. This concept is 
widely used in studies focusing on the legitimation of certain extra-legal activities (De Sardan, 
1999, Engwicht, 2017; Steinberg et al 2004) as it explains how people may resist state-defined 
notions of illegality. Scott (1985) analysed riots in East Asia during the mid-20th century through 
the prism of the moral economy. Riots occurred not because people were inherently deviant, but 
because of how they perceived justice as a result of the state/elite no longer following the rules 
that once governed relationships. Betrayal by the state, or common perceptions of feeling 
betrayed, are key here as they justify “deviant” and “illegal” behaviours in the context of the 
changing dynamic between state (elite) and population and the shift in law/regulations. Other 
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studies apply this concept in their analyses of persistent corruption (De Sardan, 1999) and illegal 
drug production (Steinberg et al 2004) in countries where laws changed in the wake of 
European/western domination and associated neglect of local traditions, culture and legal 
regulations. The legitimation of acts of resistance in the production of coca, opium and cannabis 
was therefore rooted in indigenous rights and culture (Ibid 2004).  
However, the legitimation of illegality is not simply a linear process. The complexity of 
different responses is also seen in the rejection of social and cultural understandings of extra-
legal activities as legitimate, confirming the state’s view of illegality. In criminological research, 
some authors adopt “neutralization techniques” as a lens through which to explain why people, 
who generally conform to societal norms, engage in deviant and criminal behaviour. 
“Neutralization” refers to the psychological technique of balancing and adjusting to cognitive 
dissonance (Matza, 1964; Sykes & Matza 1957). Here we see how violation of the law can create 
feelings of guilt among delinquents, who have not completely disassociated themselves from the 
legal forms of sociability. Although they are knowingly involved in illegal activities, the 
psychological strategies of neutralization help them deny various aspects of illegality.  
More recent studies have explored the concepts of “neutralization” and “moral 
economy” more deeply. For instance, in their study of the acceptance of illegal behaviour among 
orchid and antiquities collectors, Mackenzie and Yates (2015) argued that the “moral economy” 
concept could be incorporated into a criminological approach towards “neutralization”. The 
moral economy can be seen as an appeal to higher loyalties and as a “master narrative” among 
collectors of rare orchids and antiquities, which is supported by other subsidiary techniques of 
neutralization that promote the image of this type of collecting as a “good thing”.  
While agreeing that neutralisation techniques can create the grounds for legitimating 
illegal activities, I argue that the concepts of neutralization and moral economy should be kept 
separate, as communities involved in illegal practices can develop different responses towards 
illegality ranging from denial to legitimation. The moral economy is based on the idea of justice 
and a sense of having the right to break certain laws. This implies a questioning of the moral 
claims of the state itself and often makes laws unfit for contemporary social needs.  This kind of 
neutralization focuses on the cognitive dissonance that illegality creates and the psychological 
defence mechanisms of either complete denial or justification. While both concepts are useful, 
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their central premise still views legality and illegality as mutually exclusive and clearly juxtaposed; 
thus falling short of explaining conditions and contexts where boundaries may be blurred.    
Illegality can be tolerated by the state itself, signalling that such practices can continue in 
spite of formal law. Hence, the roots of the de-legitimation of power should also be sought 
within the system itself. Put simply, by deviating from its own rules and governing practices, the 
state undermines its own legitimacy. Recent studies in the post-Soviet region argue that this is 
related to the selective enforcement of laws (Brooke and Gans-Morse, 2016), and the way the 
criminal justice system operates and interacts with people (Hendley, 2015) Likewise, in their 
study of attitudes towards law in post-Soviet Georgia, Slade and Kupatadze (2017) argue that 
procedural injustice encountered by individuals in their interactions with criminal justice 
representatives have led to a low level of legitimacy of the law and state. In their study of public 
health programmes implemented in Russia, Brooke and Gans-Morse (2016) argue that 
individuals reacted to the ways in which laws were actually implemented, noting whether the 
state itself sent signals that a particular law was going to be enforced, or whether it would be a 
mere formality. Moreover, state representatives’ actions might lead to blurring the lines between 
legal and illegal activity (Heyman 1999; Reeves, 2014), further legitimating illegality among the 
population.  
  Whilst providing grounds for our analysis of the legitimation of illegality, these theories 
still lack a component that would enable us to explain both concepts of value and perceptions of 
income made illegally. Here I propose to build on terms developed in anthropological work on 
money, especially the concepts of “tainted”, “polluted” or “bitter” money (High, 2013; Shipton 
1989). These concepts allow us to better analyze the perception of hashish harvesting as 
connected with potential misfortune. Such studies focusing on “bitter” (Shipton, 1989) or 
“polluted” money (High, 2016) point to how local, religious understandings can identify some 
activities as dangerous, not only in the physical and legal sense, but also symbolically and 
spiritually. Despite the implicit moral tensions, these studies illustrate how rituals are used in the 
cleansing of money (Shipton, 1989, High, 2017) and how the purchase of durable goods with 
“polluted” money is avoided since it may alter the destiny of an owner (High, 2017).  
In order to analyse these different responses to legality and illegality, morality and 
immorality, I turn to theories of legal pluralism developed within legal philosophy (MacCormick, 
2007), sociology and anthropology of law (Tamanaha, 2001; Nujiten and Anders, 2007). 
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According to legal pluralism, state law is not the only normative system that rules the lives of 
people and alternative, sometimes conflicting, modes of normative systems can co-exist 
(MacCormick, 2007). This helps to explain the phenomenon of persistent illegality among a 
population that does not perceive itself as criminal. Although state law was seen and studied as 
the major authoritative and legitimate source of codes of behaviour within nation-states, more 
recent studies have pointed to the existence of legal plurality, recognising the fact that 
contradictory laws can co-exist (Tamanaha, 2001). In such cases, customary, religious or 
indigenous laws, or “living laws” (Urinboyev and Svensson, 2013) can co-exist within an 
institutional normative system (MacCormick, 2007). The “mirror thesis” proposed by Tamanaha 
(2001) suggests that state law might not necessarily mirror a society’s morality and customs. This 
general thesis lets us assume that different types of responses are possible in this process of 
shifting from a high- to low-level mirroring of the local normative system against the state law. 
Thus, while the predominant narrative remains the legitimation of illegality, other responses that 
account for cognitive dissonance while breaking the law, and/or perceiving their acts as immoral 
in making “tainted” or “bitter” money are possible. This could lead, though, to difficulties in 
unravelling formal and informal, legal and illegal, moral and immoral since they become 
intertwined, interdependent and entangled (Heyman and Smart, 1999: 11). Consequently, while 
acknowledging legal pluralism as a general framework for explaining the existence of various 
normative systems, we also need to remember that at certain points in the shift from a high to 
low level “mirroring” (Tamanaha, 2001), demarcating clearly the boundaries between law and 
other local normative systems becomes difficult due to the creation of “grey areas” (Heyman, 
1999).  
Hashish	Harvesting	
 
Unlike other drug supplying countries such as Morocco, hashish-makers in Toolu were unable to 
produce drugs on a large scale (Decorte et al., 2011; Kurtz-Phelan, 2005). Since they harvested 
wild cannabis, hashish-makers needed to constantly move from one field to another to find 
plants with intact upper leaves suitable for rubbing. Once in a good location, hashish-makers 
would busy themselves rubbing the leaves and seeds of plants between their palms. 
The most visible group in Toolu consisted of young adults in their twenties and thirties. 
They were mostly males, who travelled by horse to the mountains to collect the hashish. In the 
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early morning, small groups of two or three men would leave for the hills. Women made hashish 
either within the village boundaries on small patches of uncultivated land or on the nearby hills. 
In some cases, small peer groups of sixteen to seventeen year olds went alone to the fields. A few 
twelve to thirteen year olds also learned how to make hashish by joining their parents. Most of 
the hashish-makers described themselves as “everybody else” (typical) or poor and were usually 
facing extreme economic hardship. Like farmers in other post-Soviet agricultural regions, who 
experienced much higher levels of poverty than urban dwellers (Mandel and Humphrey, 2002), 
Toolu’s residents struggled to secure cash throughout the year due to market fluctuations, a lack 
of credit in rural regions, and harsh weather conditions affecting harvests.  
None of the hashish-makers were paid up-front by dealers or drug lords for harvesting 
the cannabis resin, as it happened in other countries (Ahmadzai and Kuonqui, 2011). 
Occasionally, some traders of clothes and household goods would accept hashish as payment. In 
such transactions, traders used an established price of one matchbox (usually lower than the 
price of a matchbox sold directly to dealers) and recalculated the price of a given commodity so 
that customers would know how many boxes of hashish they would need to bring to settle 
“credit”. As sellers mainly used this informal crediting system in winter or spring when most 
struggled for cash, some agreed to barter on these terms and would need to make hashish in 
summer/early autumn to return it.  
 Locals serving as middlemen or women drive the local hashish economy. The 
middleperson’s job is to connect local drug makers with dealers, usually from outside the region. 
Typically, dealers were not complete strangers to producers or middlepersons and were either 
former villagers, who had moved to other regions or friends/relatives of villagers with good 
connections. The hashish-makers usually preferred to sell in the vicinity of the village and not be 
involved in transporting the drug to other regions. Nurgul, a woman in her mid-30s, sometimes 
took the risk of working as a middleperson. She explained that she had her own contacts among 
women who made kara-kuurai [hashish]. When there was a dealer, who wanted a certain quantity, 
she just needed to spread the word among friends that they can bring the hashish to her house. 
Working as a middleperson was more profitable and farmers could earn cash faster than making 
hashish by hand. However, due to the higher risks of being caught by law enforcement officers 
during the sales, few villagers were prepared to take on this role. Nevertheless, there were some 
ten families in the village involved in this risky business. Some only worked as middlepersons 
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after obtaining “protection” from police officers to whom they were expected to pay around ten-
thousand som (£142) per month. In order to offset the expenses of bribing police and to turn a 
profit they needed to provide their services for dealers more frequently. As my interviews reveal, 
middlepersons were relatively well-off and did not make hashish themselves. Issues relating to 
the police “protection” of middlepersons and associated bribes are discussed in the following 
sections where I develop an analysis of the development of different responses to hashish-
making among the local population.   
From	Theory	to	Empirical	Evidence:	Multiple	Narratives	of	Il/legality	and	
Im/morality		
 
After collecting data during nine months of ethnographic fieldwork I had numerous notes and 
interview transcripts pointing to the complexities underpinning how hashish-making was 
perceived among the villagers of Toolu. These varied from those who rejected it as a way of life, 
to those who saw it as a legitimate means of money-making, albeit with some caution. The 
latter’s view had become the dominant narrative over the last three decades. In what follows, I 
analyse the case of hashish production and it’s legitimation. This helps us extend the boundaries 
of the theoretical framework for understanding the legitimation of illegal practices.   
	
Moral	economy	of	hashish	making		
 
Although cannabis was harvested in the territories of Issyk-Kul region during Soviet times, with 
a few exceptions when young local residents were caught making cannabis for their own 
consumption (Korchagina, 1987), different groups of non-residents of the region, and from 
wider afield, were reported as responsible for collecting and transporting the drugs throughout 
the 1980s. This situation changed in the mid-1990s when almost all local residents, young and 
old, began to collect cannabis resin. They did not suddenly start using hashish but rather 
produced it for sale. The involvement of large numbers of people in hashish-making since the 
1990s, usually unassociated with criminal underground groups, thus required some legitimation.   
 At the beginning of the 1990s it was far easier to develop an alternative morality to justify 
involvement in illegal production. Many, when relating how they started making hashish then, 
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referred to surviving the impoverishing economic conditions following the breakdown of the 
Soviet Union. Such drastic transformations resulting in the state’s withdrawal from social welfare 
and planned economy represented a betrayal of ordinary people. People still referred to their 
right to work, once provided by the state, and a right to subsistence that was highly dependent 
upon state support. However, with independence, the economic reforms that started during the 
late 1980s took a neoliberal turn and many were left without jobs since kolkhoz and sovkhoz assets 
were privatized and land distributed among the rural population. 
Many, except those from the wealthiest families, referred to the beginning of the 1990s 
as years of extreme hardship.7 Kalys, for example, remembered that “[t]he most difficult years 
were when we separated from the sovkhoz. We did not have seeds. The government distributed 
twenty-six kilograms of wheat seeds for one hectare of land, while it needs two-hundred and fifty 
kilograms”. Later, such feelings of betrayal intensified under the new neoliberal policies where 
the agricultural sector received no state protection. Consequently, prices were subject to market 
regulation alone, resulting in prices for agricultural products remaining constantly low, 
unpredictable and fluctuating from year to year. The general perception was that the government 
should be more proactive and provide protection from the “free-market” instead of leaving 
agricultural production to its own devices.  
In light of government failure to initiate new employment opportunities, claims that drug 
production was illegal became questionable in the eyes of ordinary people surviving on a range 
of precarious incomes.8 Instead, people referred to hashish-making as a form of subsistence 
during times of hardship. Almost everyone I talked to justified hashish production by referring 
to the absence of jobs in the village; the fact that people had to earn money with few options 
available and, significantly, the perceived state responsibility to guarantee jobs. Hashish-making is 
referred to here as their work, which is relatively common among drug producing communities 
across non-western societies (Calderón, 2016). The claim that it is not an illegal activity 
supplementing work but a form of work in itself was used in many other situations and contexts in 
post-Soviet countries (Humphrey, 2002: 119).  
                                               
7 Rrural regions, specifically, experienced increased poverty in other post-Soviet countries during the 1990s (Mandel 
and Humphrey, 2002: 9).  
8 People from many post-Soviet countries were surviving in any way they could. In Russia, during the 1990s, 
supplementing low salaries with covert earnings was widespread (Birdsall, 2000). 
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I frequently heard Jamilya, a woman in her mid-30s, and her friends saying to each other 
“let’s go to work” or asking “when will we work?” when talking about hashish-making. This 
acceptance as work suggests a form of a moral economy as people invoke the moral principles of 
justice in terms of their right to subsistence (Engwicht, 2016; Thomspon, 1991; Scott, 1985). The 
language of independently working and not seeking money or assistance from anyone is a 
powerful mechanism for legitimating illegal practices.  
Corrupt	law-enforcement	
 
The legitimation of illegality becomes stronger when state representatives themselves fail to 
comply with state regulations (Beetham, 2001; Mathiesen, 1965; Slade and Kupatadze, 2017; 
Tyler, 2004). Corruption and informal protection of drug producers and traffickers by law-
enforcement officers are the main reasons why drug markets flourish in many countries (Watt 
and Zepeda, 2012; Westermeyer, 2004: 128). On the one hand, it is their involvement in 
supporting the production and trafficking of illegal drugs that allows illegal drug economies to 
exist and persist globally. On the other, by accepting bribes or providing protection to producers 
and traffickers, corrupt law enforcement representatives allow illegal drug market actors to 
question law enforcement, the rule of law, and the state’s quest for drug prohibition. Cases of 
corruption create an atmosphere where people feel injustice when judged as criminal while 
others, especially those in power, violate the law (Ruggiero and South, 1995). Police involvement 
in illegal activities in other western countries also reveals an increase in law breaking among the 
general population (Tyler, 2004).  
The narrative of official involvement in extra-legal activity leading to a decline in state 
legitimacy accords with the theoretical approach to the legitimation of power (Beetham, 1991). 
Although, some high-level state authorities were either directly involved in the trafficking of 
heroin from Afghanistan and/or provided protection for easy transportation of drugs within and 
outside of the country (Kupatadze, 2014), locals did not discuss this aspect of elite corruption. 
Locals mostly referred to the low-level corruption of law enforcement representatives involved 
in the control of hashish production in the Issyk-Kul region,9 as drug-makers were constantly at 
                                               
9 In many more profitable drug markets, such as opium/heroin and coca, state elites not only provide ‘protection 
rackets’ but also oversee the business on higher levels as was the case in Mexico (Watt and Zepeda, 2012) and 
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risk of capture throughout summer and early autumn. On a local level, the provision of police 
protection (krysha), as well as bribes taken in exchange for non-arrest and opening of criminal 
proceedings, were frequently discussed.  
Kalycha eje, a woman in her fifties, was cynical about police actions, believing that they 
did not only take bribes but also sold confiscated drugs instead of destroying them. The role of 
the police, in her understanding, involved earning money (illegally) rather than upholding the 
law. Kalycha eje raised important issues in relation to police corruption. First, she pointed out 
that law enforcement is itself compromised when catching hashish-makers. In her 
understanding, shared by many in the village, the police are making money off hashish-makers – 
first, by charging bribes for release, and then by selling on confiscated hashish. Such practices of 
“performing” the law suggest that local officers have lowered the legitimacy of the police and of 
the law in general rather than demarcating the line between legality and illegality10 (Heyman, 
1999) and (Dewey, 2012; Slade and Kupatdze, 2017).   
Police officers usually arrested hashish-makers returning from the fields and mountains 
to their homes, since they were easy targets when carrying hashish. Their strategy was to arrive in 
unmarked cars and civilian clothes so that people would not be able to identify them as police 
from afar. However, these strategies contributed to a questioning and loss of legitimacy among 
the people (Beetham, 1991; Slade and Kupatdze, 2017). In the summer of 2006, a few local 
hashish-makers refused to be “arrested” by police officers. While police officers later explained 
the incident in interviews as disobedience to state representatives, locals described their actions 
as legitimate because in their perception police officers in plain clothes with no documents 
meant that they were trying to make false arrests and extort money.  
Those stopped and found with hashish typically attempted to negotiate bribes with the 
police. Often they were successful and told how much money their relatives should bring in 
order to secure their release. If the relatives were able and willing to pay then the apprehended 
person would be freed within hours. Official papers filled out by officers would then be 
destroyed and the case no longer stood. The size of extorted bribes varied from five-hundred to 
                                                                                                                                                  
Tajikistan (De Danieli, 2011; Paoli et al., 2007). Even in Kyrgyzstan, the heroin market was associated with the 
involvement of high-level state representatives in the narco-business (Kupatadze, 2014). 
10 Similar tendencies in how police officers pursue extra-legal ‘money-making’ activities are found in other post-
Soviet countries (Beck and Chistyakova, 2002; Gans-Morse, 2012; Levin and Satarov, 2000; Shelley, 1995) 
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five-thousand som (£7 to £71) depending on the amount of hashish found and their family 
connections with the police officers. The more drugs found, the more money demanded. Those, 
who only made hashish in the fields and were returning with relatively small amounts recently 
made, would be asked to pay less. In contrast, those who had a few korobochka’s (matchboxes) of 
hashish with them for selling to dealers were asked for much more in order to be released with 
no charges.  Those, caught with a number of matchboxes, were asked to pay up to twenty-
thousand (£71-285). Those not paying protection fees, and having less money for bribes, or 
lacking connections with the police were most vulnerable to arrest by officers hoping to 
demonstrate their “effectiveness” through boosting arrest statistics. 
Law-enforcement thus plays an essential role in blurring the boundaries between the 
legality and illegality of hashish harvesting since police can confiscate the drugs, transport them 
to the capital, sell for their own profit, and also provide protection to the middlepersons of the 
village for a fee. Consequently, the legitimacy of the law and of actors representing the state is 
eroded.  
Techniques	of	neutralization			
 
There were three main ways in which those not involved in hashish-making reacted to illegal 
hashish money. Some agreed that it helped families to survive economically, preventing families 
from starving or moving from the region in search of income. For those not involved in hashish 
production but who nonetheless supported it, it became easier to construct a sense of 
legitimation for the hashish producers’ behaviour: they make hashish to earn money in order to 
feed their families, pay for education, medicine, livestock or participation in social gatherings 
through gift-giving. Others did not support hashish producers but still tolerated them, 
disagreeing with the practice yet not contacting the police or other authorities to provide 
information.  
Lastly, representatives of the village’s older generation (aksakals and apa) did not support 
hashish production and condemned it. As some participants highlighted, such people prefer to 
use literal denial strategies (Sykes and Matza, 1957) instead of openly discussing hashish 
production by their own children or grandchildren. Some young participants explained that 
although their parents and grandparents disliked them making it, they would not question where 
the money came from when used for support in financially difficult times. In this case, we see 
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that the denial strategy was used not by the hashish producers themselves, but by close family 
members.  
Neutralization strategies were also used extensively by hashish-makers. The process of 
distancing themselves from their product allowed them to dissociate from the negative 
connotations of drug use. For instance, most farmers making hashish did not inquire about 
where it went; they were uninterested in what happened to hashish beyond the production and 
sale stages taking place in the village. This lack of interest in what happens next does not mean 
that people knew nothing about its destination. Instead, it was a means of detaching their 
involvement in production from further consequences. It was easier to deny responsibility for 
the effects of hashish if they lacked knowledge of where it went or who used it. One producer, 
Kanat, said: “Where does it go? Probably to America or somewhere.” Coca and opium growers 
in Afghanistan and Bolivia also deny any awareness of destinations and how the drugs were used 
(Kurtz-Phelan, 2005). Another respondent, Zuura, a woman in her 30s stated: “We hear about it. 
Sometimes, we see it on TV. Last year, I saw it in the news. It was shown how the matchboxes, 
like ours, were caught and were being emptied. Then we think: ‘aah, yeah, they went there’”. 
According to people’s perceptions, the drug users were somewhere in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan’s 
capital city, in Russia or elsewhere. Maintaining a distance from users allows them to differentiate 
themselves from consumers.  
 In such cases, it is clear that the legitimating narrative of hashish-making was not 
adopted by all in the village; it was particularly difficult for the older generation to fully approve 
the illegal activities of their younger family members. Thus, the signs of what criminologists and 
sociologists of deviance refer to as techniques of neutralization can be identified in various 
narratives of illegality.  
 
Cleansing	tainted	hashish	money		
 
Conversely, hashish money was sometimes considered as tainted and could lead to the loss of 
wealth due to local beliefs in the sacred relationship between plant, nature, and man/woman. I 
often heard the saying “nashanyn tubu jaman” which in Kyrgyz means that hashish invites future 
misfortune. Consequently, it is not always described as a “good” source of income. Money 
earned through hashish differs from money earned raising livestock, cultivating potatoes or 
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wheat, and could be considered tainted. Accidents or misfortune, such as being arrested and 
having to pay a large bribe, were perceived as a possible “curse” caused by hashish money. Here, 
we see some aspects of tainted money as similar to “polluted” money obtained through illegal 
gold mining in Mongolia (High, 2017); or “evil” money obtained through selling ancestral land 
among Kenyan tribes (1989). These concepts are derived from the local moral economy and go 
beyond legal aspects of how money was earned. They add an ethical layer of analysis rooted in 
local cultural/religious understandings of the relationship between humans and the universe.  
Studies of these moral-economic principles assist us in understanding the cultural logic of 
bitter money and how it is perceived. Kenyan tribes use rituals to cleanse money obtained 
through selling ancestral land: considered as taboo (Shipton, 1989). High (2017) argues that by 
referring to angry spirits, which put people at constant risk of misfortune, Mongolian gold 
miners practiced rituals of offerings to spirits and asking Buddhist lamas to purify polluted 
money. At the same time, such rituals were considered insufficient and they spent much of their 
money on non-durable goods, including large amounts of alcohol. Shopkeepers kept buying new 
stock in their attempt to rid themselves of money brought by gold miners. These tactics were not 
a result of the self-indulgence of miners and increased greediness of shopkeepers, but a sign of 
how people attempted to absolve the moral restrictions of polluted money (High, 2017). 
In the case of hashish production, cleansing hashish money of its bitterness was related 
to the everyday ethics of survival. Many respondents expressed a perception that those, who 
worked hard on their land and household and did not become greedy, would obtain less tainted 
money. In contrast, those who became greedy and lost interest in caring for their fields and 
livestock by turning to more profitable hashish would be dealing with tainted money and be 
punished in the future. Therefore, despite the fact that hashish money had some bitterness 
attached to it, if someone was cautious, not greedy and spent money on agriculture or on social 
obligations such as hosting, the money could be symbolically cleansed. Surprisingly, instead of 
stopping people from making hashish, through linking it to the ethics of hard work, work that 
supports families and enhances the community networks reinforced the overall legitimation of 
this illegal practice11.  
                                               
11 High’s (2017) explanation that ‘polluted money’ was easily spent on non-durable goods such as drinks and food as 
it did not lead to future bad luck can also be seen in case of hashish money. When hashish money was used for 
organizing a party among young hashish-makers in summer, no symbolic cleansing was needed.   
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Moral views about illegal practices in Toolu entered, therefore, multiple conversations 
with the state (or the perceived role of the state) and local beliefs based on customary 
understandings shaping people’s perceptions of money. At first glance, the idea of “bitter” or 
“tainted” money is typical for traditional societies such as Toolu. Economic sociologists have 
commonly argued, however, that such “mental accounting” (Thaler, 1999) or considerations and 
classifications of income as inherently different are common in modern economies. Zelizer 
(1997), for example, demonstrates how modern middle-class families in the U.S. earmark their 
income and savings based on the source of income. These studies and my own findings show 
that local residents view hashish-generated income as one of the key aspects about how and why 
they engage in the production of hashish and how this activity is further legitimized through 
symbolic cleansing. In the case of a local belief system that considered hashish-making as a right, 
the customary belief that precautions should be taken in making hashish existed in conversation 
with the belief that hashish-making is work and therefore morally justified. According to 
respondents, it should be the state’s actions that are considered unjust since these actions left 
rural farmers with no other source of economic support.  
 
Conclusion	
 
This article’s primary aim was to expand upon current understandings of the complexity of the 
legitimation of illegal practices. Using legal pluralism as a general framework of analysis, the 
study analysed perspectives towards, and the questioning of state law in the context of local 
normative systems. By discussing how people on the ground may interpret and experience the 
interrelationship between state law, customary law and law based on the moral economy of 
hashish production, we see how this process of legitimating illegality is part of legal plurality, 
which subsequently invokes different layers of morality.  
The article has argued that within the general framework of legal pluralism we can 
demarcate concepts that contribute to untangling the feelings and understandings of Toolu 
farmers in relation to their hashish-making. Here, the moral economy concept was crucial in 
identifying reasons for a low-level mirroring of state law through developing an alternative 
normative system. Since the 1990s, economic necessity among rural populations, alongside the 
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perceived betrayal by the state combined with low-level procedural justice, has created an 
overarching legitimating narrative about illegal hashish-making.  
Because the legitimacy of state power is based on people’s belief system, the 
transformation in beliefs can erode trust in the state. This sheds light on the micro-dynamics of 
how such a system was developed based on ideas of justice and the role of state as one of the 
main de-legitimating sources of the power system. People in Toolu continued to make hashish 
and developed a moral narrative about their activity in opposition to the state’s prohibition of 
drug production. Through reference to the moral economy it becomes possible to discuss how 
the majority of people felt it was morally right to make hashish in the absence of jobs and state 
support: hashish-making merely constituted one of their jobs. During the initial years of hashish 
production, the local population derived retrospective moral justification from the difficult 
experience of rapid economic transformations, during which people had to survive without the 
state welfare that had been essential to the planned economy during Soviet times. 
Yet, hashish legitimation does not end with reference to economic necessity. Another 
crucial component of contestation of the state’s legitimacy is derived from the corruption of 
state representatives with whom hashish-makers and middlepersons interacted on a daily basis 
during the harvesting period. Here, studies focussing on state representatives’ actions toward the 
people and law were crucial in understanding the feelings of injustice and mistrust people were 
accumulating. The role of the state in controlling hashish harvesting was called into question as 
more villagers discussed their observations of injustice by state authorities and their own 
predatory role in hashish production and trafficking. Law enforcement officers involved in 
protecting sales of hashish and soliciting bribes from hashish-makers contributed to the 
sentiment that boundaries between what is legal and illegal have become blurred, consequently 
lowering the legitimacy of law as a normative system. The concept of “grey areas” merging legal 
and illegal practices with no clear cut separation also reminds us how, in practice, the shift from 
high to low mirroring of laws is not a straightforward process.  
However, even within these largely accepted narratives of hashish as work and state 
injustice, there were cases of psychological tensions experienced throughout the community due 
to the reliance on the law as a guiding normative system and at the same time seeing, hearing 
about, or experiencing the fact that the law is broken on an everyday basis. Here, neutralization 
theory helps us to analyse the consequences of accepting legal systems while remaining part of 
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illegality. In such cases, the response to the psychological tensions was to resort to a strategy of 
neutralizations.  
Moreover, the local discourse on hashish-making was complicated by the cultural logic 
linking cannabis plants to people’s destinies and the subsequent use of hashish money for 
various needs. We see that the local moral discourse that hashish-making is justified and right 
was mitigated by another belief that people should not seek to make a large personal profit from 
cannabis plants as this illegal practice will make their money cursed. I argue that legal pluralism 
as a general framework allows us to identify another normative system that is based on the 
spiritual understandings of people. Here, it is useful to use theories developed mainly in 
economic anthropology to understand the cleansing of “tainted” money. Referring to the 
spiritual powers of cannabis and that it can “hit” somebody back was important for people and, 
therefore, affected the way that the illegal hashish economy developed in the region. This belief 
system, “being an active and dynamic constituent of an economic life” (High, 2017: 60), was one 
of the reasons why people in the region did not cultivate cannabis plants and harvested hashish 
from wild cannabis growing in the Karkyra Valley.  
Finally, the article is able to address the local points of view on law and state in a post-
Soviet country from a criminological perspective. I suggest that the de-legitimation of state 
power is due not to a nihilistic culture among the population, but is rather rooted in the political 
and economic processes that took place in the post-Soviet region. At the same time, the 
persistence of illegal drug production and other types of illegal activities in mainly emerging 
economies indicates that legitimation of illegality due to moral reasoning is not unique to the 
post-Soviet region.  
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